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Abstract
We analyze in this paper how various forms of State intervention can impact the microcredit
market in developed countries. Using a simple model where entrepreneurs borrow without
collateral, we study the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies on microﬁnance institutions' lending behavior.
We ﬁrst introduce state intervention through the loan guarantee and show that, not surprisingly,
it increases the number of entrepreneurs receiving a loan. However, after modeling business
development services provided by the microﬁnance institution, we show that the government
loan guarantee can have a counterproductive eﬀect by reducing the number of entrepreneurs
beneﬁting from such services. We therefore analyze an alternative policy: the subsidization of
business development services by the State. We then provide a condition under which - for ﬁxed
government expenditures - such subsidies are more eﬀective (in terms of outreach) than loan
guarantees.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the role of government intervention on microcredit market in developed
countries. Contrarily to the extensively studied case of developing countries, microcredit in devel-
oped countries mostly takes the form of individual loans (as opposed to group - or peer - loans) and
often beneﬁts from state intervention through direct subsidies or loan guarantee. This intervention
seems to be mainly due to the positive eﬀect of microcredit on employment and poverty alleviation
through self employment and entrepreneurship. Facilitating the access to microcredit in turn ben-
eﬁts the state by reducing other social expenses. In this paper we analyze various forms of public
subsidies and attempt to compare them.
Microcredit is generally deﬁned as a small loan to individuals in poverty designed to encourage
entrepreneurship or access to employment. Micro-borrowers often lack collateral. They rarely have
steady employment and their credit history can hardly be veriﬁed. More generally, these individuals
cannot meet the minimum requirements to access the traditional credit market, and microcredit
is often considered to be a solution to exclusion from the traditional banking system and, conse-
quently, to credit rationing.
Microcredit is a relatively new device in developed countries. According to the academic litera-
ture, state intervention via loan guaranties (as opposed to direct subsidies) is considered to be the
most eﬃcient measure in dealing with credit rationing. By participating in this speciﬁc market,
government impacts the number of both pure rationed borrowers (who don't receive credit despite
sharing the same characteristics with accepted borrowers and willing to pay a higher interest rate)
and redlined borrowers (who don't receive credit at any interest rate because their projects don't
generate a high enough return to the lender)1. In the case of small-business lending, microﬁnance
institutions (MFIs thereafter) in developed countries are strongly involved in business development
services (or entrepreneurial training more generally). These entail devices oﬀered in addition to
loans that aim at increasing the chances for the project to succeed. These devices mostly consist in
training programs, for example, in accounting or management. In this paper we shed light on the
impact of state intervention on business development services.
To do so, we base our work on Tirole's model of credit rationing in which borrowers are hetero-
geneous according to their project return and can enhance the probability of project success by
exerting a costly and unobservable eﬀort (see Tirole (2005)). To adjust to the case of microcredit,
1For detailed deﬁnitions of diﬀerent types of credit rationing see Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990) pp. 847849.
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we model borrowers without any initial capital endowment and "banks" that lend without collateral
requirements.
In this basic setting, we ﬁrst introduce state intervention through the loan guarantee (which is
common in microcredit in developed countries). We allow the state to pay back to the lending
institution a proportion of the capital lost if the entrepreneur's project fails. Not surprisingly, we
ﬁnd that whatever the size of the guarantee, such a policy increases the number of entrepreneurs
that receive a loan by widening the range of project returns optimally ﬁnanced by the bank.
The key contribution of our work consists in analyzing how the loan guarantee interacts with busi-
ness development services (or training more generally), another key feature of microcredit targeting
small businesses in developed countries. To develop the analysis, we allow MFIs to invest in a device
that increases the probability of project's success. In the absence of the state guarantee, business
development services crowd-in a number of the excluded borrowers if and only if the relative gain
generated by this measure is lower than its relative cost. However, when both business development
services and the state guarantee are modeled, the loan guarantee can have a "perverse" eﬀect, since
it can reduce the incentive for the MFIs to provide business development services. In particular,
assuming that project returns are uniformly distributed among borrowers, we show that the num-
ber of additional borrowers ﬁnanced thanks to business development services is larger when state
doesn't guarantee loans. The intuition behind this result is that, from the point of view of the MFI,
the loan guarantee decreases the expected return on business development services.
Such a counterproductive eﬀect leads us to model an alternative policy that would consist in sub-
sidizing business development services. To fairly compare both policies, we analyze under what
circumstances a government with a ﬁxed budget would prefer to use it to subsidize business devel-
opment services (BDS thereafter) rather than to guarantee loans. We provide a condition under
which subsidizing BDS in turn brings better results (in terms of outreach) than the loan guarantee.
We now provide an overview of the existing literature with reference to this paper. As we have
already mentioned, microcredit provides a solution to the borrowers who are excluded from the
traditional credit market. In academic literature these individuals are denoted as either "rationed"
or "redlined" borrowers (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) or Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990)). Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) show in particular that, for a given interest rate, there exists a critical value of
return below which the bank doesn't ﬁnance the project. One of the aims of our paper is to analyze
how such a threshold evolves depending on state intervention in the case of microcredit (i.e. of
uncollateralized loans). Note that we don't model explicitly "small" loans which is unarguably an
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important characteristic of microcredit. Therefore, our model can be understood as a model of
social banking (microﬁnance institutions being a particular example of social banks). However, by
modeling other important aspects of microﬁnance as the lack of collateral requirements, the pres-
ence of the loan guarantees and business development services, we will proceed in the following by
attributing our model to the microﬁnance ﬁeld.
Our paper is not the ﬁrst to study the eﬀect of the loan guarantee. Craig et al. (2007) analyze
empirically the case of Small Business Administration, a program providing small ﬁrm loan guar-
antees in the USA, and ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant link between the level of SBA lending and
local economic growth. In a subsequent paper, Craig et al. (2008) ﬁnd a positive link between the
average annual level of employment in the local market and SBA lending. These papers present a
rationale for government intervention in small ﬁrm lending in general, but especially in microcredit
lending that directly promotes self-employment and small start-ups.
The importance of government intervention in credit rationing is also highlighted in the case of
France in a paper by Aubier and Cherbonnier (2007). They show evidence that credit rationing
was signiﬁcant during the 2001-2004 period for small and medium-sized enterprises. Facilitating
access to microcredit then beneﬁted the state by reducing other expenses (unemployment beneﬁts,
etc.). Similarly, Emran et al. (2007) analyze how microcredit market interacts with labour market
in a macroeconomic model. In the present paper we disregard the interactions with other markets
and focus on partial equilibrium on the (micro)credit market. More precisely, we don't study the
ﬁnancial eﬃciency of public intervention and exogenously assume that the state's objective is to
increase the outreach, that is to crowd-in more entrepreneurs.
Regarding the comparison of various policies on the credit market, Gale (1990) analyzes the ef-
fects of federal policies on credit allocation and economic eﬃciency in a model with asymmetric
information. He argues that the loan guarantee is more eﬃcient than pure direct lending programs
and pure interest subsidy as it operates through raising the return to the bank. Adding business
development services to the analysis, we enrich this discussion by challenging his result regarding
indirect subsidies. More precisely, we show that the loan guarantee might be less eﬃcient than some
indirect subsidies that can impact the (expected) return to the bank.
The relationship between microcredit and subsidies is historical. Grameen Bank, for example, has
constantly beneﬁted from subsidies despite reporting proﬁts (see Morduch (1999))2. Moreover,
2Cull et al. (2007) conﬁrm the existence of MFIs having achieved the "ultimate promise of microﬁnance" (i.e. self-
sustainability and large outreach to the poor). However, according to this study such MFIs are mainly exceptions.
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subsidized programs seem to perform better (than unsubsidized ones) in outreaching the poorest
borrowers (see Morduch (2000)). Unsubsidized MFIs seem to sacriﬁce one dimension of their social
performance either by setting higher interest rates, targeting richer clients or decreasing the share
of female borrowers (see D'Espallier et al. (2013)).
Still, the academic literature on microﬁnance subsidization remains relatively scarce, mainly due to
diﬃculties in obtaining high quality data. One exception is Hudon and Traca (2011) who ﬁnd that
subsidies generally increase the eﬃciency of MFIs. This may be related to the concept of "smart
subsides" deﬁned by Armendariz and Morduch (2010, pp. 333) as "carefully designed interventions
that seek to minimize distortions, mistargeting and ineﬃciencies while maximizing social beneﬁts".
Mieno and Kai (2012) also advocate the use of such subsidies. They ﬁnd that subsidies received
at the early stage reduce the cost pressure for star-up MFIs and therefore allow them to achieve
economies of scale. Finally, Armendariz et al. (2011) argue that subsidization is eﬃcient as long as
there is no uncertainty regarding the timing or the amount of subsidies.
More generally, academic literature on microcredit design mainly revolves around developing coun-
tries where peer lending was  until recently  both the norm and the explanation for the success
of microcredit.3 Townsend (2003), however, questions this idea and argues that the choice between
individual and group lending is not simple. Particularly, group-lending prevalence depends on the
economy-wide average wealth: richer economies should experience less group lending. This analysis
might explain why individual lending is prevalent in developed countries and provides a rationale
for individual lending model in our framework.
The originality of our work lies mostly in the modeling of business development services (i.e. train-
ing of the entrepreneurs by the MFI) that complements microcredit as a tool of ﬁnancing excluded
individuals. Non-ﬁnancial services provided by MFIs are termed "Microﬁnance-Plus" in Lensink
and Mersland (2009). These kinds of programs are very popular in developed countries where they
generally take the form of entrepreneurial training. In developing economies, however, this "plus"
services often take the form of social trainings, including health or educational services.
Several papers empirically assess the impact of these types of non-ﬁnancial services. One example
is Karlan and Valvidia (2011) who study training programs in Peru using randomized control trials
and show that they have little eﬀect for borrowers in this context. Another example is Lensink
et al. (2011) who use data for MFIs in 61 countries. They show that MFIs providing both ﬁnance
3The key role of peer-lending in explaining high repayment rates in micro-credit in developing countries has been
recently challenged by Giné and Karlan (2009).
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and business development services have similar performance as MFIs providing no "plus" services.
However MFIs with social services do signiﬁcantly better in terms of outreach.4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we lay out the basic model and
analyze the "laissez faire" benchmark. We then introduce successively the state guarantee (section
3) and business development services (section 4). After having shown the that state guarantee can
have a counterproductive eﬀect on business development services, we analyze the alternative policy
of business development services subsidization in section 5. Section 6 concludes and presents some
possible extensions and limitations of the model.
2 The model
Our modeling is based on the classical corporate ﬁnance model (see e.g. Tirole (2005)). It consists
of a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs5, each endowed with a project that needs a ﬁnancing
D (identical for all agents). Each project can either succeed and generate a return of ρD or fail
and give zero return (the invested capital is then lost). The return on investment (ρ) is assumed to
be heterogeneous among agents (and distributed on
[
ρ, ρ
]
). To increase the probability of success,
an entrepreneur must exert a costly eﬀort (unobserved by the MFI). For simplicity, we assume that
there are only two possible levels of eﬀort, high (the entrepreneur behaves) and low (the entrepreneur
misbehaves). The probability of success with high eﬀort (p) is higher than the probability of success
with low eﬀort (p): p > p. However, if an entrepreneur chooses to exert a low eﬀort, he receives a
private beneﬁt, ψ. If the entrepreneur behaves he receives no private beneﬁt.
The principal (an MFI, or more generally a social bank) then chooses the projects she invests in
(that is the borrowers she lends D to) and sets the interest rate (r). We assume that the expected
proﬁt of the MFI has to be nil for each contract. This reﬂects both the guiding principle of MFIs
and the increasing competition on the microcredit market (see Cull et al. (2011)).
The moral hazard issue comes from the unobservability of entrepreneurs' eﬀort by the MFI. For
an entrepreneur to exert high eﬀort, the interest rate has to be incentive compatible. The zero
expected proﬁt condition together with the incentive compatibility constraint will therefore give the
minimum project return threshold to receive ﬁnancing and the interest rate.
In contrast to Tirole (2005), we assume that entrepreneurs have no capital to invest in their project.
This diﬀerence allows our model to capture the speciﬁc feature of the microcredit market where
4For detailed examples of MFIs providing (themselves or not) non-ﬁnancial services see Dunford (2001).
5Risk aversion won't impact our result, as there are no ﬁrst derivative eﬀects.
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borrowers often lack collateral.
Moreover, in line with Tirole (2005), we assume that the projects are only viable when the en-
trepreneur behaves, meaning that (i) the Net Present Value (NPV) in this case is positive i.e.
pρ > 1 ∀ρ, or pρ > 1 and (ii) the NPV of the projects is negative if the borrower misbehaves,
meaning that pρ < 1− ψD ∀ρ or pρ < 1− ψD .6
Let us ﬁrst solve the model under "laissez-faire", that is without state intervention. The en-
trepreneur receives the total return of the project net of the capital due to the bank. He receives
ρD − (1 + r)D if the project succeeds and zero if it fails. We assume that ρ > 1 + r. Therefore,
the entrepreneur will face the following incentive compatibility constraint:
p [ρD − (1 + r)D] ≥ p [ρD − (1 + r)D] + ψ (1)
This amounts, for a given interest rate, to the minimum return for which the borrower exerts high
eﬀort:
ρmin =
ψ
D∆p
+ (1 + r) (2)
where ∆p = p− p.
Moreover, when borrowers exert high eﬀort the expected proﬁt of the MFI writes (note that it is
independent of project return):
E (pi) = p (1 + r)D −D (3)
and the zero proﬁt condition gives:
r =
1− p
p
(4)
Introducing the latter expression for the interest rate in (2), we ﬁnd that the bank will invest in all
the projects generating a return higher or equal to the threshold ρmin:
ρmin =
ψ
D∆p
+
1
p
(5)
Up to now, our modeling of microcredit was limited to a classic loan without collateral. However,
at least two other major aspects are key to microcredit in developed countries: state intervention
(mostly through the loan guarantee) and business development services. Let us successively include
these two patterns starting with the loan guarantee.
6We keep these assumptions on the viability of the project for the rest on this paper. The presentation of the
conditions on NPV changes when the loan guarantee and BDS are introduced. Because of their limited interest we
don't present them for each model. Note that they don't alter our results.
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3 The introduction of the loan guarantee
The loan guarantee is an essential tool for the expanding microcredit market in developed countries.7
By lowering the risk taken by the MFI, such a policy aims at crowding in a part of the initially
excluded borrowers.
In accordance with real world experience (see previous footnote), we assume that state guarantees
a proportion γ < 1 of the loan outstanding if the project fails. As it only impacts the consequence
of project failure for the MFI, it changes neither borrowers' return nor their incentive compatibility
constraints. However, the zero expected proﬁt condition then becomes:
E (pi) = p (1 + rγ)D + (1− p) γD −D = 0 (6)
leading to an interest rate equal to:
rγ =
1− p
p
(1− γ) (7)
which is, not surprisingly, lower than the benchmark interest rate. We thus end up (using (2)) with
ργmin =
ψ
D∆p
+
1− γ (1− p)
p
(8)
where ργmin represents the minimum return a project should generate to get ﬁnanced by the MFI,
in presence of the state guarantee.
Therefore, as expected, the minimum project productivity threshold required for ﬁnancing decreases
thanks to the loan guarantee (ργmin < ρmin). The intuition behind this result is simple: the interest
rate that represents an "insurance" for the bank against high-risk agents. With the loan guarantee,
the government will bear a part of this costly "insurance". The bank will provide microcredits at
a lower interest rate. Hence, a larger part of the entrepreneurs will optimally exert high eﬀort and
a larger part of the project will be ﬁnanced. Thus, state guarantees reduce credit rationing and
can therefore allow the state to save on other social expenses, such as unemployment beneﬁts.8
It is important to emphasize that we don't investigate the ﬁnancial eﬃciency of a loan guarantee
7For example, in France, several public organisms guarantee capital in case of loss: the "Fonds de Cohésion
Sociale" or Caritas (50% of the outstanding principal and unpaid interest) for consumer loans (that aim at ﬁnancing
goods that contribute to job seeking, such as cars, computers, business suits, etc...) and "France Active Garantie"
(70% of the outstanding principal) for self employment or small business loans. These guarantees are free from the
MFI's point of view. More recently the European Commission and the European Investment Bank started providing
up to 75% guarantee for microcredits in the European Union through the European Progress Microﬁnance Facility.
8According to Brabant et al. (2009), it is cheaper  in the case of France  to subsidize microcredit than to pay
welfare beneﬁts to micro-borrowers.
7
program. Total gains from successful microcredit cannot indeed be easily identiﬁed as it may lead to
lower unemployment beneﬁts, better education for children or better health for example. Obviously,
there is a range of non-appropriable beneﬁts ignored by the single market approach that should be
taken into account. However, the cost-beneﬁt analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.9
4 Modeling Business Development Services (BDS)
As we have already noted, business development services is another key feature of small business
microﬁnance in developed economies. MFIs often provide services that aim at increasing the prob-
ability of entrepreneurs' projects to succeed (for example accounting or management trainings that
help micro-borrowers to run their business).
We model business development services as an action provided by the MFI (at ﬁx cost K) that
increases by an amount  the probability of entrepreneur's project to succeed. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that this incremental probability doesn't depend on entrepreneur's eﬀort (of
course one can imagine mechanisms that make the two eﬀorts  by the borrowers and the MFI 
complementary or substitute eﬀorts). If the MFI provides BDS, the probability of success with high
and low eﬀort writes respectively:
p (λ) = p+ ε and p (λ) = p+ ε
The independence of the increase in the probability of success thanks to BDS from borrower's eﬀort
simpliﬁes the model a lot. It implies that entrepreneur's behavior doesn't depend on the choice of
MFI to provide BDS (it doesn't change ∆p). Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint in
the presence of BDS remains the same (inequality (1)) and the minimum project return compatible
with eﬀort is still deﬁned by equation (2).
4.1 In the laissez-faire case
Let us assume for now that the lending institution bears the cost of the business development
services, K (independent form the project productivity ρ). In case it provides BDS, the expected
proﬁt of the MFI is:
E (pi) = (p+ ε) (1 + rλ)D −D −K = 0 (9)
9Such an analysis would still be very diﬃcult to implement, as noted in Armendariz and Morduch (2010).
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and the equilibrium interest rate charged to clients receiving BDS is:
rλ =
1− (p+ ε)
p+ ε
+
K
(p+ ε)D
(10)
Note that it is not obvious to compare the equilibrium interest rate in presence of BDS and the
benchmark interest rate in (4).
Finally, using (2) and (10), we ﬁnd the minimum return required by the MFI when it engages in
BDS:
ρλmin =
ψ
D∆p
+
1
p+ ε
+
K
(p+ ε)D
(11)
Proposition 1. The availability of business development services will increase the outreach of bor-
rowers (ρmin > ρλmin) if and only if
ε
p
>
K
D
(12)
that is if and only if the relative gain in probability of success generated by business development
services exceeds its relative cost.
.
If the latter condition is not satisﬁed, i.e. if ρmin < ρλmin, no BDS will be provided as it will not
crowd-in any additional borrowers. On the contrary, if ρmin > ρλmin, all the entrepreneurs with
projects generating a return belonging to the interval [ρλmin, ρmin] will be ﬁnanced and will receive
BDS.
4.2 In the presence of the state guarantee
Let us now study how business development services interact with the state guarantee. This seems
to be a promising analysis as intuition suggests that state intervention might lower the incentive
for the MFI to provide such services.
When the state guarantees a proportion γ of the loan, the zero proﬁt condition of an MFI providing
BDS writes:
E (pi) = (p+ ε) (1 + rγλ)D + (1− (p+ ε)) γD −D −K = 0 (13)
implying:
rγλ =
1− (p+ ε)
p+ ε
(1− γ) + K
(p+ ε)D
(14)
While it is easily noticeably that rγλ < rλ (the state guarantee decreases the interest rate), the
comparison of rγλ with rγ is not trivial. Put diﬀerently, as in the previous section, depending on
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their cost, business development services may increase the interest rate.
Once again, our simpliﬁcations ensure that borrowers' behavior is not impacted by BDS. Therefore,
using equation (2), we obtain the minimum return required by the bank in the presence of both
business development services and the state guarantee:
ργλmin =
ψ
D∆p
+
1− γ (1− (p+ ε))
p+ ε
+
K
(p+ ε)D
(15)
We therefore have ργλmin < ρλmin and obviously, in the presence of BDS, the state guarantee
increases the range of ﬁnanced borrowers. However, it is not clear whether BDS are eﬀectively used
in the presence of the state guarantee (that is if ργλmin < ργmin). Proposition 2 provides a condition
under which BDS crowd-in additional borrowers when loans are guaranteed.
Proposition 2. In the presence of the state guarantee, the provision of BDS by the MFI will
lead to a higher outreach in terms of the number of ﬁnanced entrepreneurs (that is we will have
ργλmin < ργmin) if and only if
ε
p
>
K
(1− γ)D (16)
.
Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, it appears that condition (12) is weaker than condi-
tion (16). This might indicate that BDS crowd-in less borrowers when the state guarantees loans.
This is for example the case when KD <
ε
p <
K
(1−γ)D as then no borrowers are crowed-in in the
presence of the state guarantee thanks to BDS, contrarily to what would happen without public
intervention. Whether this is also the case when BDS are eﬀectively used in both cases (that is
when εp >
K
(1−γ)D ) depends on the distribution of project returns among the potential borrowers.
Business development services then crowd-in borrowers with project returns in between ρλmin and
ρmin in the absence of public intervention; and in between ργλmin and ργmin if the state guarantees
a part of loans.
In the simple case of a uniform distribution of returns, less borrowers will be ﬁnanced thanks to
BDS in the presence of the state guarantee if ργmin − ργλmin < ρmin − ρλmin. As we have
ργmin − ργλmin = εD (1− γ)−Kp
p (p+ ε)D
and
ρmin − ρλmin = εD −Kp
p (p+ ε)D
.
next Proposition holds.
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Proposition 3. If the distribution of the project returns is uniform, the number of additional
entrepreneurs ﬁnanced thanks to business development services is larger without the state guarantee.
.
This result comes from the fact that the return to the bank from BDS in the presence of the state
guarantee writes:
εD[(1 + r)− γ]
and is therefore decreasing in γ.
Proposition 3 might however not hold if the distribution of the project returns is not uniform. In
particular, if project returns are highly concentrated on the interval [ργmin, ργλmin], then a smaller
interval would not necessarily result in a smaller number of projects ﬁnanced.
5 An alternative policy: subsidizing business development services
The possible perverse eﬀect that the state guarantee can have on business development services
leads us to analyzing an alternative policy that would consist of subsidizing BDS. To compare this
alternative policy with the loan guarantee, we assume that government allocates a ﬁxed budget
to its intervention in the microcredit market and has to choose between the two policies. More
precisely, we assume that it has a budget G per contract. Without loss of generality we assume that
this budget is equal to the cost of business development services, K. Therefore, if the government
chooses to subsidize BDS, it bears the total cost of the program. Conversely, if it chooses to subsidize
the loans, it pays G = K directly to the MFI in case the project fails.
The aim of this section is to compute the minimum project return required by the MFI if the
government subsidizes business development services and to compare it with the one found in the
previous section. This would allow us to deﬁne the most eﬀective policy when the aim of the
government is to increase the outreach of the entrepreneurs (for a ﬁx budget).
The zero proﬁt condition of the MFI when government subsidizes BDS writes:
E (pi) = (p+ ε) (1 + r˜λ)D −D = 0 (17)
what gives as interest rate:
r˜λ =
1− (p+ ε)
p+ ε
(18)
Using (2), the minimum project productivity threshold is then:
ρ˜λmin =
ψ
D∆p
+
1
p+ ε
(19)
11
that we compare with the minimum project return threshold under the state guarantee (see equation
(8)) with γD = K:
ρ˜γmin =
ψ
D∆p
+
D − (1− p)K
pD
(20)
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. For a ﬁxed public expenditure, subsidizing business development services will crowd-
in more borrowers than the loan guarantee if and only if:
ε
p
>
(1− p)K
D − (1− p)K (21)
.
Therefore, if the aim of the government is to crowd-in more borrowers on the credit market, under
condition (21), subsidizing BDS would be more eﬀective than the loan guarantee. These results
broaden the results of Gale (1990). Indeed, whereas Gale (1990) states that the loan guarantee is
more eﬃcient than any direct subsidy, we show in this paper (using a diﬀerent kind of model) that
this is not necessarily the case for indirect subsidies.
6 Concluding remarks
Microcredit in the developed countries mainly takes the form of individual loans. It is often char-
acterized by two important features which are government support through the loan guarantee and
business development services. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between these two key
features. Our motivation relies on the intuition that the loan guarantee might impact the MFI's
involvement in business development services and probably deteriorate its eﬃciency in terms of
outreach.
By extending Tirole's (2005) model to the microcredit market with the loan guarantee and business
development services we prove that the state guarantee can be counterproductive in terms of the
number of entrepreneurs ﬁnanced thanks to business development services (in particular when the
distribution of the project returns is uniform). This central ﬁnding leads us to studying an alter-
native solution: the subsidization of business development services and then comparing the two
policies in terms of outreach.
One of the limits of our model concerns the interactions of the microcredit market with the missing
markets. Indeed, state intervention in the credit market can have interesting implications for the
labour market for example (see Emran et al. (2007)). In the present paper we focus on the "pure"
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impact of state intervention on the lending behavior of an MFI. The investigation of the ﬁnancial
eﬃciency of the public intervention is left for further research. This will in particular be needed to
explain why the state chooses to participate in the microcredit market. Finally, another potential
extension of our model consists in allowing the state to mix the two policies. For example for a
ﬁxed level of expenditure, the government might choose to partly subsidize business development
services and partly guarantee loans.
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